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Abstract—Bacteria are microorganisms found in the human
body, and almost in everywhere, that recently they have been
investigated as human gut’s health indicator. After colonizing
a surface, bacterial populations form biofilms, which is their
natural protection mechanism against physical attacks, harmful
chemical compounds and environmental changes. Recent studies
have shown that bacteria can be engineered to act as biosensors
and bioactuators, externally controlled by electric signals. De-
spite the benefits provided by biosensors in terms of metabolic
diseases diagnosis and treatment, they also open the door to
novel cyberbioattacks due to the impossibility of implementing
security mechanisms in resource-constrained engineered bacteria.
In this context, we have reproduced a distributed denial of
service (DDoS) cyberbioattack performed by engineered bacteria
that diffuse jamming signals affecting the production of the
biofilm structure. A pool of experiments has shown that higher
amplitudes and periods in the signal controlling the engineered
bacteria have a greater impact on the biofilm disruption.
Index Terms—bacteria, biofilm, engineered cells, DDoS, cyber-
biosecurity, cybersecurity.
I. INTRODUCTION
Bacteria are microorganisms that can be commonly found
inside of the human body and has been shown to be an
indicator of human’s gut health [1]. For instance, the natural
signalling between the gut cells and microbiome supports the
human digestive process and the immune response [1]–[3].
Furthermore, the coordinated actions and communications of
the microbes within the intestine, can result in stress-induced
inflammatory responses that might result in an unhealthy state
[1]–[3]. In addition to the interaction with host cells, the
bacterial natural signalling capabilities are also related to their
mechanisms to survive in dynamic environments. From those
survival mechanisms, one of the most important for bacteria is
the creation of biofilms. This structure protects a sessile (i.e.,
non-moving) bacterial population against physical attacks,
harmful chemical compounds and environmental changes.
During the biofilm formation and maintenance, several sig-
nalling pathways are activated to sense a particular surface.
After colonizing it, the bacteria will secrete Extracellular
Polymeric Substances (EPS) that will surround and protect
them, as well as control the influx of nutrients. Due to the
complexity of these processes, biofilms constitute a strong
natural defense mechanism.
Recently, a further investigation of bacterial natural sig-
nalling processes has been proposed as they can produce
different systemic organism’s responses that can be helpful for
the diagnosis and treatment of metabolic diseases [4], [5]. For
that end, whole-cell biosensors have been engineered using
bacteria to detect and directly measure these disease-related
molecular signals. These whole-cell biosensors are especially
interesting for therapeutic applications as they have a high
sensitivity to a wide range of detectable chemical substances.
They can be ingested or implanted on a particular location
of the human body to collect health-related data to support
the development of novel therapeutics and diagnostics (i.e.,
theranostics) [6]. By expanding this concept, we envision a
future where biosensors will be built from engineered bacterial
populations to provide long-term theranostics and be remotely
monitored using a conventional network infrastructure.
The main benefit of having engineered bacteria is the
possibility of controlling some of their behaviours through
external electric signals. Nevertheless, due to the resource-
constrained nature of engineered cells, security mechanisms
to avoid or prevent malicious stimuli cannot be implemented.
It opens the door to an incipient and promising research topic
called cyberbiosecurity [7], [8]. In this scenario, attackers can
send malicious electric signals to a engineered population of
bacteria to control and change their signalling processes and
therefore their legitimate purpose. As a realistic example, an
attacker could control engineered bacteria to disrupt the forma-
tion of a biofilm-like structure that provide natural defenses
to the biosensor population through a series of coordinated
emission of molecular signals. Existing solutions in the state-
of-the-art have studied how bacteria can be engineered to
prevent biofilm formation [9], [10]. However, the impact of
cyberbioattacks affecting the disruption of biofilm-like struc-
ture is still an open challenge.
With the goal of improving the previous open challenge, in
this paper we have reproduced a distributed denial of service
(DDoS) [11] cyberbioattack diffusing jamming signals that
affect a group of bacteria that are aiming to produce a biofilm
structure. The DDoS cyberbioattack is implemented through978-1-7281-6486-1/20/$31.00 ©2020 IEEE
BiofilmBiofilm
(b)





10 10 10 10 0
Fig. 1: Engineered bacterial population executing a DDoS
cyberbioattack implemented by a variable jamming signal able
to inhibit biofilm formation. (a) DDoS attack with a periodic
signal of 1-0-1-0. (b) DDoS attack with a periodic signal of
1-1-0-0.
the diffusion of protein molecules from engineered populations
of bacteria behaving according to an external signal controlled
by an attacker (see Fig.1). Finally, we performed several
experiments that show the attenuation of the biofilm structure
production depending on the amplitude and period of the
signal controlling the engineered bacteria.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Sec-
tion II presents the details of the models we have followed to
reproduce the behaviour of the DDoS cyberbioattack affecting
the generation of molecules in charge of the biofilm formation.
Section III measures the impact of the different behaviours of
the cyberbioattack. Finally, conclusions and future work are
drawn in Section IV.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this paper, we focus on Staphylococcus aureus bacterial
populations and investigate a DDoS attack scenario. In this
context, a hijacked engineered bacteria population emits a
series of molecular signals to prevent a bacterial biosensor
population to produce a biofilm structure (see Figure 1). As
outlined, the three main actors involved in the investigated
scenario are:
• TN. A fraction of the bacterial biosensor population
responsible for producing and transmitting a signal to
induce the behaviour of the remaining population in the
receiver node to form a biofilm.
• RN. The fraction of the bacterial biosensor population
which receives the signals from TN to form a biofilm.
• JN. A population of engineered bacteria being controlled
by an attacker and emitting a jamming signal to interrupt
the communication of the previous two populations and
prevent the biofilm formation.
In this case, after the colonization of a particular surface (e.g.
human organ wall) the bacterial biosensor population start to
exchange signals among themselves to form a biofilm. At
the same time, a second bacterial population emits signals to
disrupt with this communication. These signals emitted by the
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= k4 ·RAm(t̂)2 + k5 · Cm(t̂) (4)
dAm,e(t̂)
dt
= (pm,out ·Am(t̂)− pm,in ·Am,e(t̂))
−D ·Am,e(t̂)
(5)
where Am(t̂), Am,e(t̂), Rm(t̂), RAm(t̂), Cm(t̂) are the in-
ternal and external inducer, receptor, complex and dimerized
complex concentrations, respectively; cA and cR are the mini-
mum levels for Am(t̂) and Rm(t̂), respectively; kA and kR are
the rates of DNA copying required for the protein production;
KA and KR are the protein consumption rates, k0 − k5 are
the molecular production rates; pm,in and pm,out are transport
rates inside and outside the bacteria, respectively; t̂ = t− τp,
with t is the time in hours, τp is the production delay, and
m = TN is when the molecular signals are emitted by the
TN bacteria or m = JN if the molecular signals are emitted
by the hijacked engineered bacteria, JN population.
In absence of attack (JN), the received signal by RN
(emitted by TN) s(t) can be expressed as [9]:
s(t) = ht(t) ∗ (nt ·ATN,e(t̂)) + n(t) (6)
where n(t) is the Additive White Gaussian Noise, and ‘∗’
denotes a convolution operation [12]. The communication







where rTN is the average Euclidean distances from TN to RN
and v is the velocity of the wave formed by the molecular
pulse-based jamming signal propagation. When the attack
comes into play (JN), apart from s(t), RN also receives
the signal coming from the JN, which is expressed by the
following equation [9]:
sj(t) = ht(t) ∗ (nt[ATN,e(t̂)])
+ hj(t− τd) ∗ (nj [AJN,e(t̂)]) + n(t)
(8)
where τd is the propagation delay for a signal produced by the
engineered bacteria in the jamming node JN (in hours). The
communications channel between JN and RN bacteria hj(t)







where rJN is the average Euclidean distances from JN to RN.
A. Biological DDoS model
We consider that the attacker generates a digital signal, hc(t)
to remotely control the engineered bacterial population JN,
which is modeled as follows [13]:
hc(t) = [x0, x1, ..., xl] (10)
where xl represents the amplitude of the received signal,
with 0 ≤ l ≤ t, depending on the desired type of attack.
This attacker controlling signal will affect the JN transport
rate pJN,in. In this case, these two parameters will become
dependent on hc(t), and different from the ones considered
for the TN bacteria that are constant values. Both pJN,in and
pJN,out affect the generation of the jamming signal by JN,
represented by (1) and (5). The bacterial population inside
transport rate pJN,in is evaluated as:
pJN,in(t) =
{
1− e−hc(t)·τ ·t, ifhc(t) > 0
e−hc(t)·τ ·t, ifhc(t) = 0
(11)
By further investigating the results obtained in a previous
work (see [9]), we found that ratio between constant transport
rates pJN,in and pJN,out impact non-linearly the production
of the external autoinducer production AJN,e(t̂). Therefore, in
this paper we opted to evaluate pJN,out(t) as a ratio of the
transport rate function pJN,in(t) to investigate their impact on
the external autoinducer production AJN,e(t̂).
pJN,in(t) = k · pJN,out (12)
where k is a scale parameter with value 0.25, as explained
in the next section. In Section III we considered different
DDoS strategies, where we varied the attacker controlling
signal (hc(t)) and the relationships between the transport rates
pJN,in(t) and pJN,out(t) to evaluate the attack impact on
the legitimate molecular signal transmission required for the









Fig. 2: Molecules emitted by JN for different ratios of pin and
pout
where nt is the TN population size, and T is the total duration
of the molecular transmissions. Equation (13) is the attenuation
caused by the jamming signal on the legitimate transmission.
III. SYSTEM ANALYSIS
In this section, we first analyse the impact that the mod-
ification of the value of pin and pout has on the equation
(5), which represents the liberation of molecules from JN. For
that, we define a range of values for both variables between
0.1 and 0.4, and evaluate the set of equations from (1) to (5)
with multiple ratios between (we considered the same values
of [9]).
Fig.2 represents the relationship between pin and pout
for the different evaluations of the equation (5). Each line
indicates an specific instant where the equations have been
evaluated, which are linearly spaced between 0 and 16 hours,
the total duration of the simulation. The considered time
takes into account the S. aureus biofilm maturation process,
which have been previously investigated for 6, 12, 16 and 24
hours [9], [14]. As it can be seen in Fig.2, the ratio of 0.25
offers the highest production of molecules for the jamming
population (JN). That is to say, keeping the value of pout four
times greater than pin generates the highest rate of molecules.
Because of that, we establish this value on the k constant of
equation (12), since it is the most impacting relationship of
these parameters to perform jamming attacks.
After that, we define three sets of experiments, where the
signal generated a frequency of 17.4µHz and a distance
between JN and RN of 500 µm, based on the experiments
of [9]. The first experiment consists on modifying the am-
plitude of the input signal and thus affecting the engineered
bacteria to vary the production of molecules. The results of
Fig.3a indicate that bigger amplitude values generate a higher
attenuation on the communication between TN and RN. It is
important to say that, based on the behaviour of the equation
(11), values of amplitude higher than 1 have not a significant
impact on the attenuation.
The second set of experiments consists in the variation of
the duration, or period, of the signal when the amplitude is
greater than zero. That is to say, a repetition of a zero followed
(a) Variation of the amplitude of the input
signal.
(b) Modification of the period of consecutive
active pulses of the input signal.
(c) Combination of both amplitude and period
variations on the input signal.
Fig. 3: Set of experiments based on modeling the input signal sent to the engineered bacteria to induce jamming attacks.
by a number of consecutive non-zero values. These results are
presented in Fig.3b, where it can be seen that increasing the
duration of the attack pulses derives in a higher attenuation
from the RN perspective.
Finally, Fig.3c illustrates a combination of modulating the
input signal with different values of amplitudes and periods.
From this figure we can extract that bigger values on both the
studied dimensions derive in higher attenuation and, based on
that, that the attack is more effective.
As a conclusion, this section illustrates the feasibility of
performing a DDoS cyberbioattack generating jamming sig-
nals over the formation of bacteria biofilms by the use of
engineering bacteria. The modulation of the amplitude and
period of an external signal aiming to control the behaviour
of bacteria population has an impact on the attenuation of
the legitimate communication between TN and RN bacteria
groups.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have reproduced a DDoS cyberbioattack
diffusing jamming signals that affect the generation of biofilm.
The DDoS has been implemented through the emission of
protein molecules from engineered populations of bacteria
behaving according to an external signal controlled by an
attacker. Several experiments showed how the amplitude and
period of the external signal can control the behaviour of
engineered bacteria to disrupt the biofilm production. As future
work we plan to propose and reproduce novel cyberbioattacks
affecting the behaviour of engineered bacteria and the pro-
duction of biofilm. Moreover, we plan to extend our analysis
to other bacterial strains to propose a more general DDoS
cyberbioattack model.
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